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Opinion

The Syria-isation of Iran: Why the Islamic Republic could soon share the Assad regime’s fate

Israel’s dominance in the skies has shattered Iran’s defences—now, a strike on Ayatollah Khamenei could bring the entire regime crashing down

June 16, 2025 11:47
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Israeli F-35s and F-15s refueling mid-air with a KC-707 tanker. (Image: IDF)
4 min read

We are witnessing the “Syria-isation” of the regime in Iran. In the immediate term expect chaos and a domestic clampdown. In the medium to long-term, the prospect of Ayatollah Khamenei – the 86-year-old supreme leader – suffering the same fate as Bashar al-Assad, the deposed Syrian dictator, is now a genuine possibility.
Israel’s remarkable operation inside Iran since Friday has not only successfully targeted the Iranian regime’s nuclear facilities, scientists and the senior military leadership, but has also effectively dismantled the Iranian air defence systems.

Israeli air superiority over Iran means one thing: the IDF can attack whatever it wants, whenever it wants. This is perhaps the most consequential aspect of the conflict, thus far – and bares uncanny resemblance to the final years of the Assad regime.

From 2017 onwards, Israel had established full air superiority over the Baathist air defence systems, which were simply unable to deter the IDF’s consistent targeted strikes against key military and security commanders and infrastructure. Unable to fend off these strikes, the Syrian dictator responded by doubling-down on domestic suppression to consolidate himself internally, while stepping-up a campaign to export drugs globally in a perverse attempt to terrorise the outside world through narcotics jihad. In the end, this status quo – which had checkmated the Baathists – would eventually hollow out the regime from within and finally provide the space for opposition forces to topple Assad.
The “Syria-isation” of Iran’s regime has left Tehran with few options. And herein lies the problem for Khamenei: the military doctrine of the Iranian regime has become defunct. For decades, this doctrine had centred on three pillars: Islamist militias and proxies abroad, ballistic missiles (combined more recently with drones), and a nuclear weapons program.

Israel’s post-October 7 response, however, almost entirely decapitated Iran’s proxy pillar, not least Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was designed to act as a deterrent to an Israeli strike against Iran. Tehran’s remaining proxy assets either do not have the willingness to intervene – such as the Shia militias in Iraq – or the capabilities to cause significant damage, as is the case with the Houthis in Yemen. Likewise, the two direct IRGC attacks on Israeli territory last year surprisingly revealed the weaknesses of the Iranian ballistic and drone programmes against Israel’s air defence systems. And while the ongoing IRGC barrage against civilian populations in Israel has occasionally managed to penetrate Israel’s air defence system, its success rate still remains around six per cent. Finally, the IRGC has suffered a significant set-back in its pursuit to acquire nuclear weapons – the final pillar of its military doctrine. Israel’s strikes on key enrichment nuclear facilities and scientists have caused substantive damage to this pillar.

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